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TRADE COSTS, TRADE BALANCES AND CURRENT 






In this paper we test the well-known hypothesis of Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) that trade 
costs are the key to explaining the so-called Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. Using a gravity 
framework in an intertemporal context, we provide strong support for the hypothesis and we 
reconcile our results with the so-called home bias puzzle. Interestingly, this requires a 
fundamental revision of Obstfeld and Rogoff’s argument. A further novelty of our work is in 
tying bilateral trade behavior to desired aggregate trade balances and desired intertemporal 
trade. 
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A large body of work seeks to explain the so-called Feldstein–Horioka (FH) puzzle; 
the phenomenon of excessive reliance on domestic saving in order to finance domestic in-
vestment in a world of high capital mobility. In a recent provocative paper, Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (2000) propose trade costs as the explanation for not only this puzzle but also five 
other major puzzles in international macroeconomics. Although there are now a large number 
of competing explanations for the FH puzzle (see, for example, Obstfeld (1986), Dooley, 
Frankel and Mathieson (1987), Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) and Taylor (2002)), Obstfeld 
and Rogoff (OR) emphasize that the alternative explanations often suffer from other prob-
lems. In this paper, we test OR’s key emphasis on the role of trade costs in explaining the FH 
puzzle. We provide strong support for their hypothesis and we reconcile our results with the 
so-called home bias puzzle. Additionally, we shed light on the importance of national plans to 
borrow and lend in explaining bilateral trade. Our approach is perhaps best understood against 
the backdrop of OR’s interpretation of the FH puzzle.  
The OR story runs as follows. First, any shift in a country’s trade balance requires 
some movement between import prices inclusive of trade costs and prices of home goods ex-
clusive of trade costs. A real exchange rate change is thus required to alter trade balances be-
cause of trade costs alone. Pressures to resist such changes may then explain the observed 
sluggishness of trade balances. In developing their argument, OR rely heavily on the in-
tertemporal budget constraint. For example, in the current period, a country with a large nega-
tive trade balance will face higher prices inclusive of customs, insurance and freight (CIF) 
and those exclusive of these, or free on board (FOB), and thereby less favorable terms of 
trade. In the next period, however, there will be a resulting need to pay the added obligations 
on foreign debt and this will imply an opposite movement in the terms of trade. Thus, nega-
tive trade balances today mean lower expected future consumer prices relative to present con-
sumer prices and therefore imply higher expected real interest rates. As a result of this direct 
link between trade costs in goods markets and foreign borrowing, OR make the current ac-
count the focus of their discussion in addressing the FH puzzle. In support of their hypothesis, 
OR demonstrate the presence of a negative correlation between the average values of real in-  2
terest rates and current account surpluses over the period 1990 to 1997 for 24 OECD coun-
tries and up to 32 others. Since then Bergin and Glick (2003) have reached the same conclu-
sion in a related empirical test and with similar reasoning. 
In this paper, we use a gravity model to capture the effects of trade costs on bilateral 
trade. In contrast to other gravity studies, however, we admit intertemporal substitution in the 
usual general equilibrium form of the model. We also impose an intertemporal objective. It 
turns out that this objective plays an important role in enabling us to assess the significance of 
trade costs in explaining aggregate trade and the FH puzzle. Our measure of trade costs relies 
on the relationship of consumption prices to output prices. But we introduce some other con-
trols in our tests with results that, in turn, strongly reinforce our interpretation of our measure 
as reflecting the influence of trade costs.  
The outline of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In the next section we provide 
a general overview of some closely related work in order to motivate our research. Section 3 
develops our theory and test specification. There we explain both our general version of the 
gravity model and the particular features of our model that permit us to reason about national 
trade balances despite our reliance on bilateral trade data. Our data set is discussed in Section 
4.  Section 5 contains our empirical results of the tests of the gravity equation. In this section, 
we demonstrate that large movements in the trade balance require large changes in the prices 
of imports relative to home goods. According to our estimate, a one percentage-point move-
ment in the trade balance would require a one and two-thirds percentage-point movement in 
consumer prices relative to domestic-output prices. Section 6 develops the reasoning underly-
ing our view that this relative price influence can be properly seen as reflecting essentially 
trade costs. Next, section 7 reconciles our results with OR’s analysis of the home bias puzzle, 
which emerges as an important issue, as we shall see. Section 8 concludes.  
  
 
2. Motivation and Related Literature 
In this section we consider the basic story OR use to explain the FH puzzle in terms of 
trade costs, entertain an alternative explanation offered by Kraay and Ventura (2000, 2002)   3
and show how our own methods can be used to explain the FH  puzzle. 
As we have seen, the OR explanation for the FH puzzle relies on exploiting the in-
tertemporal budget constraint. In the current period, a country with a large negative trade bal-
ance will face higher CIF prices relative to FOB prices, and the resulting need to pay the 
added obligations on foreign debt in the next period will imply an opposite movement in the 
terms of trade at that time. Thus, because of trade costs alone, negative trade balances today 
mean lower expected future consumer prices relative to present consumer prices now and 
therefore imply higher expected real interest rates. However, and crucially, the associated 
swings in desired trade balances, in turn, should lead to corresponding capital flows. The real-
ity, as Feldstein and Horioka and many others have observed, is quite different.  Instead, there 
is a close link between national savings and national investment suggesting that international 
capital movements provide for only limited intertemporal substitution. The reason, in OR’s 
view, is that agents recognize that, because of trade costs, swings in trade balances will imply 
dramatic movements in real interest rates that, in turn, are socially costly. The existence of 
trade costs therefore places limits on intertemporal substitution and the smoothing of con-
sumption through trade. As a result, we observe rather sluggish current account behavior. OR 
and in their wake, Bergin and Glick (2003), support this hypothesis with evidence of a strong 
negative correlation between average real interest rates and current account surpluses.  
Interestingly, Kraay and Ventura (2000, 2002) and Ventura (2002) propose a com-
pletely different explanation of the FH puzzle to Obstfeld and Rogoff’s that, nonetheless, also 
focuses on the current account. Instead of trade in goods markets, Kraay and Ventura (KV) 
stress financial behavior and, in particular, desired portfolio diversification, as the key to un-
derstanding the FH puzzle. They assume that wealth consists of capital and foreign assets (net 
foreign assets), while, in investing in capital, investors are concerned not only with the ex-
pected return of their investment, but also the riskiness of their investment. In addition, they 
also assume that the rates of return on capital in productive activity − both domestic and for-
eign − are approximately constant (i.e. the marginal product of capital is constant) rather than 
declining over time. Therefore, as wealth changes over time, agents try to maintain the same 
portfolio balance between capital and foreign debt:  the desired mix of capital to wealth stays   4
the same. Consequently, savings over time lead to progressive rises in the size of country 
portfolios, but not their composition. With growth, deficit countries will borrow more while 
surplus countries will lend more. FH’s essential result follows: since wealth to output ratios 
stay the same, ratios of the current account balances to output tend to stay the same over time 
and savings and investment are closely correlated.  
However, the essential facts of current account behavior suggest that focusing directly 
on the current account in order to make sense of the FH puzzle, as both OR and KV do, is 
likely to be misguided. Contrary to OR, current borrowers cannot expect to be future lenders 
within the foreseeable future. Instead, the evidence would support the view that many deficit 
countries can run deficits almost indefinitely because of previously accumulated net foreign 
assets, and conversely. Both Kraay, Loayza, Servén and Ventura (2000) (based on a study of 
68 countries) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002a) (based on a study of 20 OECD countries) 
demonstrate this very point. In another study covering the same 68 countries as Kraay et al. 
do over the period 1970-1998, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002b) point out that a (small) ma-
jority of countries did not switch at any time between the state of net lender or net borrower. 
Moreover, when they used an error-correction representation of the data to estimate the speed 
of adjustment towards a trend value of the ratio of net borrowing to GDP, they found that the 
movement has a half-life of 5-6 years.
1 All of this supports KV’s departure from OR and their 
preference for the assumption that countries are essentially close to a desired mix of debt in 
international wealth and try to maintain that mix.  
However, contrary to KV’s position, in practice, current account balances are no more 
sluggish than trade balances. If countries really tried to restore a certain desired portfolio mix 
in the long run, as KV posit, then whatever might happen in the short run (partly as a result of 
changes in asset prices and yields), changes in trade balances would lead to offsetting move-
ments in trade balances and net interest payments on net foreign assets in the long run. Thus, 
the trade balance would be less sluggish than the current account. More generally still, KV’s 
view would imply a tendency for the current account balance to be stationary in the long run 
                                                 
1 In a study that focuses precisely on current account reversals (understood as sharp changes in a short period of 
time) in all countries of the world for which data are available, 157 of them, over 1970-2001, Edwards (2004) 
reports reversals constituting only 12 percent of the national observations.   5
without bearing any similar implication about the trade balance. In this paper, we demonstrate 
that the current account is no more persistent or sluggish than the trade balance. Thus, in our 
view, the key to understanding the FH puzzle lies in the sluggish nature of trade balances.   
These considerations suggest a basic modification of OR’s explanation of the FH puz-
zle.  Evidently, any country wishing to alter its current account position must alter its trade 
balance and therefore must move some of its prices from prices FOB to prices CIF or the 
other way. What our previous discussion suggests then is that if the shift in relative prices 
needed to obtain a modest change in the current account is large, the resulting shift in prices 
will act as a deterrent. Sluggishness of trade balances will ensue and this will render current 
account balances sluggish too. On this view, trade costs then underlie the FH puzzle, just as 
OR say, but on more direct grounds than theirs. We shall proceed on this logic, which we 
view as containing the crux of OR’s argument.  
Our test procedure will also deviate from previous methods of dealing with trade bal-
ances, current accounts and the FH puzzle. Since trade costs are the key issue, we shall use 
the principal tool in trade to deal with trade frictions, namely, the gravity model. We believe 
this has a number of advantages. First, it relates our results to a large body of earlier empirical 
work on trade flows. Second, by centering attention on bilateral trade rather than aggregate 
trade or the current account, our choice of procedure greatly widens the range of relevant ob-
servations available for testing. Third, by focusing on bilateral trade, the choice also enables 
us to treat the prices of imports relative to home goods as an exogenous variable. Evidently, 
the influence of a country’s imports from any specific trade partner on its relative prices at 
home can be supposed small.   Thus, single-equation estimation is reasonable.   
Yet, since the gravity model focuses on bilateral trade, a difficult challenge arises in 
the effort to draw implications about aggregate trade balances from the model. This is a chal-
lenge we try to meet by conditioning our estimates of the influence of relative prices on bilat-
eral trade on countries’ desired aggregate trade balances (which, in turn, depend on their de-
sired intertemporal substitution). Crucially, we find that relative prices only emerge clearly as 
an influence in the econometric results once we constrain countries to have an intertemporal 
objective throughout the estimation period. Thus, not only are our macroeconomic concerns   6
reflected in our methodology, but they play a vital role in our estimates.   
There is also the fundamental issue of the appropriate measure of relative prices to use 
in a gravity framework. What we need is some index of prices of imported goods relative to 
prices of domestically produced ones. To this end, we employ the ratio of CPI prices relative 
to GDP prices. Better alternatives may exist, some of which relate more closely to trade costs, 
but their use would gravely limit the number of observations in our study. This consideration 
led us to stick to the CPI/GDP measure in this exploration of the topic, which is our first. But 
we shall control for other factors besides trade costs that may affect the results. In particular, 
the foreign exchange rate will enter. OR ignore this factor in developing their general argu-
ment. They do so for good reason, since even under a single world money, countries cannot 
import more and export less without an increase in their prices CIF relative to prices FOB. 
Trade costs inexorably come in even under a common currency. Notwithstanding this consid-
eration, in the data itself the prices CPI relative to prices GDP could evidently reflect the in-
fluence of the nominal exchange rate to some extent, and if they did so, the required price ad-
justment in order to move the trade balance would partly reflect a nominal change. In this 
case, the price adjustment might be less socially costly.  Furthermore, the coefficient of our 
relative price variable would then reflect something other than trade costs. However, when 
added as a conditioning variable (with appropriate weights), the nominal exchange rate does 
not alter the level or the significance of our estimate of the ratio of prices CPI relative to 
prices GDP. Consequently, we interpret the impact of this price ratio as truly independent of 
any nominal influence.  
 
3. Theory and test specification 
a. Theory 
We propose deviating from the simple form of the gravity model on a single point in 
order to apply this model to the impact of trade costs on trade balances: we shall assume that 
households in different countries differ in their tastes for intertemporal substitution. In all 
other respects, we shall follow the typical treatment where all preferences for goods in the 
world are identical, output is exogenous and exports are demand-determined. On these as-  7
sumptions, there is generally no reason for systematic deviations from bilateral trade balance.
2 
Accordingly, researchers who rely on these assumptions usually take the dependent variable 
as total bilateral trade, measured as the sum, or the average, of bilateral imports both ways. 
Subsequently, they ignore any influence of relative price, as they must, since the opposite in-
fluence of this variable on trade partners (in the case of an elasticity of substitution different 
from one) becomes impossible to study.  However, once we allow for differences in intertem-
poral preferences, each country may aim for a different trade balance. Consequently, it makes 
sense to distinguish the desired imports of country A from country B and the desired imports 
of country B from country A. In this context, it is possible to study the influence of relative 
price on imports as distinct from exports in the framework of the simple gravity model.
3 
Suppose then that households in each country decide on their aggregate current con-
sumption by maximizing an intertemporal utility function, subject to an intertemporal budget 
constraint. A certain desired level of current spending follows in each country depending on 
exogenous endowments, production functions and (assuming small countries) exogenous 
prices. Let us label this desired current spending, or absorption, by a particular country, i, as 
Ai. Having allowed for divergences in desired intertemporal substitution between nationals of 
different countries, varying desired trade gaps between Ai and output Yi can also appear. 
Whatever the resulting desired borrowing or lending, all households decide the composition 
of their consumption spending by maximizing an identical CES utility function (more pre-
cisely, an identical intratemporal sub-element of their intertemporal utility function) of the 











j i c β U ,      ( 1 )  
where cij is country i’s consumption (in physical units) of the goods (varieties) produced by 
country j, βj is a distribution parameter, reflecting Yj/Yw, the output of country j relative to 
world output, and K is the number of countries in the world. Country i maximizes this func-
                                                 
2 Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2004) make the same point and then proceed to distinguish between bilateral 
imports and exports differently than we do: by allowing for heterogeneities between firms. But there is plainly 
no conceptual conflict between their manner of proceeding and ours. 
3 See Helpman (1987), McCallum (1995) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). For a notable example of a 
version of the gravity model distinguishing between import and export behavior from the start and where relative 
prices thus prominently enter, see Bergstrand (1985, 1989).    8
tion subject to the condition:    
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where pij is the (common) price of goods (varieties) produced by country j and facing country 
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Imports of country i from country j, mij, equal pijcij and therefore: 


















= .       ( 5 )  
A similar relationship holds for bilateral imports of country j from i: 




















= .       ( 6 )  
However, since AiYj need not equal AjYi, mij need not equal mji  
  Suppose, next, that trading costs drive a wedge between home and foreign prices:  
      p ij = (1 + tij) pj and  pji = (1 + tji) pi ,   tij   > 0 for i≠j and tii = 0  (7) 
where tij reflects all border costs faced by country i in its trade with country j as a percentage 
of Pj, both monetary and non-monetary. pij will now differ considerably between countries 
even though pj is everywhere the same, and partly so for non-monetary reasons. In the light of 
the trade costs, equation (6) can be written as:   
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In this paper, we shall estimate a version of equation (8).  
 
 
   9
b. Test specification 
In order to estimate equation (8), we need a measure of the term (1+tij)pj/Pi, which is 
often referred to as bilateral trade resistance relative to multilateral trade resistance, where the 
tij term captures bilateral resistance and the Pi one (itself a weighted-average) reflects multi-
lateral resistance. As is common in the gravity approach, we treat bilateral trade resistance 
and multilateral trade resistance separately. In the case of bilateral trade resistance, we intro-
duce the usual gravity variables concerning impediments or aids to bilateral trade, such as dis-
tance, language and political associations.  
Multilateral trade resistance requires special discussion. Assume that the price of 
GDP, 
i
GDP P , is a reflection of pi, the price of the home good(s). Suppose, in addition, that we 
can interpret the consumer price index, 
i
CPI P , as a weighted average of prices of home goods 




CPI P / P rises, there is then a rise in foreign relative to home prices and 
a negative price influence on country i’s demand for foreign goods in general relative to home 
goods. This is clear in the case of final goods, to which we limit the theoretical discussion 
(like OR and most of the literature on the gravity model). Imports of intermediary goods may 
raise a complication, since they also affect
i
GDP P . However, they influence 
i
CPI P  as well. Thus, 
in their presence, if only the mix of final and intermediate goods in trade stays constant, a rise 
in imports will still increase 
i
CPI P  relative to
i




CPI P / P i s  a  b a s i c  
reflection of multilateral trade resistance.  
In a multiple currency world, another such reflection will be a weighted average of the 
exchange rate of the currency of country i with the other world currencies. This next variable 




CPI P / P  but will not necessarily be fully so. Besides, as already 
indicated, it is important to separate the potential influence of the nominal exchange rate from 
the relative price term.  Therefore, we will consider the weighted-average nominal exchange 
rate of country i, Ei, as a separate influence in the analysis. In addition, even upon a cursory 




CPI P / P and Ei only cover two of many sources of 
multilateral trade resistance affecting trade between countries i and j (since all bilateral trade 
frictions connected to third countries enter into the expression). In order to reflect these other 
influences, country fixed effects for countries i and j may serve in the typical way. The   10
dummy for country i will then reflect all the missing effects on country i’s desired imports 
from everyone, while that for country j will reflect all the missing effects on its exports to 




CPI P / Pa n d  E i are country-specific variables, once the country dum-
mies are added, the estimates of the influences of the two evidently will only relate to the time 
dimension or their movement over time.  
In light of these considerations, we may write equation (8) in the following form:   




CPI P / P ) + a4 ln Ei + a5  M
i Z  + a6  X
j Z  + A7 Gij + εij,  (9) 
where  M
i Z is a dummy for the importing country, X
j Z  is a dummy for the exporting country, 
Gij is a matrix of bilateral gravity variables pertaining to bilateral trade resistance (relating 
specifically to trade of country i with the particular partner j), and εij is a disturbance term 
with the usual properties. On the basis of equation (8), it follows that: a1 = –lnYW and a2 = 1.   
A corresponding equation to (11) exists for the imports of country j from country i:   




CPI P / P)  +  a 4 ln Ei+ a5
M
j Z+  a 6
X
i Z  + A7 Gji + εij,   (10) 
where  M
j Z  and  X
i Z  are, respectively, dummies for countries j and i as importer and exporter. 
Consequently, a more general statement of the estimating equation is: 




CPI P / P) t+ a4 ln Eit + a5 
M
i Z+     
a6 
X
i Z  + a7 
M
j Z +  a8 
X
j Z  + A9 Gijt +A10 Dt +εijt .       (11) 
where we have also added a matrix of time dummies Dt. There are effectively 2N different 
country dummies of the sort displayed in equation (11), two per country. In the case of any 
particular observation, mij, all of these dummies are zero except two, 
M
i Z and  X
j Z . We thus 
propose estimating equation (8) in the form of equation (11). 
  However, equation (11) only reflects the intertemporal concern of countries in the 
derivation in a vague way. The most direct reflection of this concern is the substitution of 
domestic absorption for domestic income in the aggregate for current spending by the im-
porter. The only other reflection is our distinction between bilateral imports and exports and 




CPI P / P ) and Ei. But these features do 
little to insure that the desired trade balance has a basic role in the estimates. In sum, equation   11
(11) offers inadequate reflection of the emphasis on desired intertemporal substitution in the 
theoretical derivation. In order to sharpen the role of the intertemporal aspect, we propose es-
timating equation (11) under the theoretical constraint that each country continually tries to 
achieve a desired balance between imports and exports during the study period.  
Specifically, we shall introduce the following restriction on the coefficient of the fixed 
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where
M
i N is the number of in-sample observations of imports by country i, 
X
i N is the number 
of in-sample observations of exports by country i, Mi are the imports of country i from its K–1 






ij i m M ,    j≠i                                                (13)    
and  ji M are the imports from country i by its K–1 trade partners, 





ji m  j ≠i                                               (14) 
The coefficient a5 evidently is a factor in each period. According to equation (12), each coun-
try adjusts its imports continually so as to attain the observed aggregate of imports minus ex-
ports over the observation period as a whole (T individual periods).
4 Therefore, the equation 
gives teeth to the idea that countries pursue a trade balance objective. Note that imposing the 
constraint strictly on the fixed effects for the importing country is precisely correct since ex-
ports are demand-determined according to the model.  
 Ideally, the constraint should refer to the difference between the imports and the ex-
ports of countries, Xi, rather than the difference between their imports and the imports of the 
rest from them ji M . Xi is always lower than ji M because of trade costs. Specifically,  





ji i ji ji i c p m X ,   j ≠ i        0 <  ij τ <   ij t ,             (15) 
                                                 
4 A preferable form of the restriction might be  
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But this form is not feasible.   12
where τji is the money difference between the price to the importer and the price to the ex-
porter as a percentage of the export price pi. τji must be less than tji because, as mentioned ear-
lier, at least on a cross-sectional basis, the demand for imports also depends on various non-
monetary trade costs (related to language, cultural affinities and political ties, etc.) which do 
not affect the difference between the value of shipments from i and foreign purchases from i. 
But as we do not model the differences Xi – Mji, or the K–1 monetary differences between 
prices FOB and prices CIF, τjipi, in equation (15) (any more than we model other aspects of 
trade resistance), these differences must be seen as exogenous. Thus, imposing the restriction 
on  i M –  i X or on  i M – Mji amounts to the same thing.  
Equation (12) imposes K
M different restrictions in the estimates of equation (11), 
where K
M is the number of importing countries in our sample.  In the absence of these restric-
tions, the correlation between (Mi–Mji)t and the estimated values ( i M ˆ –  ji M ˆ )t in equation (11) 
is only 36%. Hence, the estimate of (11) reflects the trade balance behavior of the countries 
only in a vague way, as we suspected it would. However, once these restrictions are imposed, 
the correlation between (Mi–Mji)t and ( i M ˆ –  ji M ˆ )t rises to over 80%. There is therefore little 
doubt that the restrictions serve their assigned role of reflecting the individual countries’ ag-
gregate net imports (which we identify with their desired net imports) over the observation 




CPI P / P  on trade only emerges signifi-
cantly in our work following the introduction of these restrictions. This is very reassuring 




CPI P / P  in our specification rests essentially on 




CPI P / P would emerge as significant when desired intertemporal substitution plays a major 
role in the estimate, but not otherwise.
5  





CPI P / P . This coefficient is our basis for inferring how large a movement in the price 
of imports relative to home goods a country must entertain if it wishes to change its trade bal-
                                                 
5 Note, in this connection, that the trade balance constraint in our work operates completely differently in the ob-
servations for US imports from Japan than in the observations for Japanese imports from the US, for example. 




CPI P / P  as an exogenous variable poses little problem since we 
estimate bilateral imports rather than aggregate imports or the trade balance.   13
ance. In other words, we base our conclusions entirely on the results following the restrictions 
in equation (12). 
 
4. Data  
  Our data set consists of annual observations over 1980-2000 inclusively covering im-
ports of 134 countries from 154 countries (see the data appendix for a full listing). The data 
on CIF bilateral imports, Mij, come from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DTS, 2002). 
They are expressed in US dollars and converted into constant dollars using the US Consumer 
Price Index. The IMF database accounts for 99% of world trade in merchandise, but the per-
centage of trade in merchandise by the 134 importing countries in our regressions is some-
what lower because of missing data for some of the relevant macroeconomic variables aside 
from trade. The absorption of country i, Ai, is obtained by subtracting the trade balance from 
GDPi, where both series come from the World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI 
(2003)), are expressed in US dollars and divided by the US consumer price index. The ratio of 
consumer price indices, PCPI, to GDP deflator indices, PGDP, is taken from the World Bank 
CD-Rom (WDI, 2003). The nominal effective exchange rate is computed for each importing 
country i based on the nominal exchange rates found in the WDI (2003) and a matrix of im-
ports weights for all the trading partners in the sample with a weight greater than one per 
cent.
6 The other variables are quite standard in the literature on the gravity model of trade. 
The computation of distance relies on the arc-geometry formula between the two most popu-
lous cities. Population is drawn from the WDI (2003). A set of dummies serve to identify 
whether two trading partners are in a free trade area, whether they share a border, whether 
they use the same currency, whether one of the two is a protectorate or an overseas territory 
(e.g. France and French Guyana), whether they have been in a colonial relationship post-
1945, or they have had the same colonizer. The data appendix contains a full account of these 
dummies. The common language variable is from  Melitz (2005), who calculates a continuous 
                                                 
6 We experimented with different alternative specifications of the nominal effective exchange rate. Since these 
different measures did not materially affect any of our results, they are not reported in the paper, but are avail-
able on request from the authors.   14
indicator with values going from 0 to 1 rather than a 0-1 dummy. A summary of the statistics 
and the correlation matrix are in the appendix. 
 
5. Econometric Results 
a.  The time series behavior of trade balances and current accounts 
As discussed in section 2, Kraay and Ventura’s argument says that the ratio of the cur-
rent account balance to output is stationary whereas the ratio of the trade balance to output is 
less so, if at all. In general, following KV, we would expect the persistence properties of the 
two series to be quite different.   
We shall base our inferences about the persistence of the two series on variance ratio 
statistics for different annual lags up to 8 (in a time series of 21 years for most countries). 
This statistic (see Cochrane (1988)) rests on the null hypothesis of a random walk against the 
alternative of mean-reversion. The statistic is: 
 ], )) q q ( Var ( )) q q ( Var [( ) k / 1 ( V
1
1 t t k t t k
−
− − − − =  
where k denotes the lag length, and Var is the variance of the series q, i.e. the ratio of either 
the trade balance or the current account to output. Under the null of a random walk Vk should 
equal unity, while if a series is stationary Vk will be significantly less than unity.  
The most telling feature of the results is that a very similar pattern of persistence ap-
pears for the current account and the trade balance. For the majority of countries, both series 
are stationary. But especially when this is so, there is little to distinguish the behavior of one 
time series from the other. Figure 1 displays this point for a sample of 16 countries, chosen to 
reveal the general picture.  The sample consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Finland, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, South Korea, Switzer-
land, Thailand, US, and the United Kingdom. In 12 of the cases, both ratios to output are sta-
tionary (the ratio of net income on foreign assets to output is included in the figure as supple-
mentary information). For these cases, the persistence of the two series is much alike. In three 
of the other four cases − Finland, Germany and the United Kingdom (the US is the fourth) − 
the current account is more non-stationary than the trade balance.  
This evidence is difficult to reconcile with KV’s explanation of current account behav-  15
ior based on desired international portfolios. Countries can only maintain a stable current ac-
count as a percentage of output by adapting their trade balance to that end. Thus, the evidence 
that ratios of trade balances to output are as persistent as current account ratios does not fit 
with their view. On the other hand, this behavior is consistent with our position that the slug-
gishness of trade balances underlies the sluggishness of current accounts. 
  
b.   The gravity model results 
We turn next to the evidence regarding our basic equation (11). All of our tests are 
maximum likelihood. Table 1 presents the estimates of this equation in the absence of any 
constraints for the full sample period and for two sub-samples, 1980-1989 and 1990-2000. In 
these estimates, therefore, differences in desired trade balances between countries play only a 
vague role, as explained previously. The nominal exchange rate is also not included in the 
equations reported in Table 1. According to the full sample results, the coefficient on the rela-
tive price term PCPI/PGDP has the correct sign but is very small and indeed statistically indis-
tinguishable from zero. In addition, all of the coefficients pertaining to distance and absorp-
tion, two essential gravity terms, bear the correct signs, are significant and have plausible co-
efficient values. The remaining gravity terms, except for the Common Country and Free 
Trade Area dummies, are also statistically significant and have plausible magnitudes. One in-
teresting result is that the common language dummy has a larger impact on trade than the cur-
rency union dummy, whose influence is notably lower in magnitude than the figure initially 
proposed by Rose (2000) in his provocative study. In general, the results for the two sub-
samples resemble those for the full sample, though the coefficient on the relative price term is 
barely statistically significant at the 10% confidence level in the sub-sample of 1980 to 1989. 
The previous results do not impose intertemporal preferences in equation (11) pre-
cisely. However, the set of results contained in Table 2 follow once such preferences have 
been imposed. Once again, we offer these results separately for the full sample period and for 
the two sub-samples of 1980-1989 and 1990-2000. Crucially, the coefficient on the PCPI/PGDP 
term is now highly statistically significant in the entire period as well as in both sub-periods.   16
In all three cases, it has a value of approximately 0.3. In addition, the sign, magnitude and sig-
nificance of the usual gravity variables are broadly similar to those reported in Table 1 where 
the trade constraint was not imposed. Once again, the coefficients on the gravity terms are 
broadly similar across the two sub-samples (although, in this case, there are some differ-
ences).
7  
We believe that these results strongly support the theory. In principle, the relative price 
term affects imports relative to exports rather than total trade in the model. Thus, it makes 
sense that its impact would only show up clearly once desired intertemporal trade came ex-
plicitly into play.  On the other hand, the other influences (apart from the nominal exchange 
rate) affect total trade, rather than the trade balance. Therefore, they should all be essentially 
independent of intertemporal considerations and that is in fact exactly what we find.  
Quite significantly too, these results incorporate the impact of all relative price move-
ments at the world level. Such movements are perfectly correlated with the time dummies. 
Thus, the estimates allow for the three oil shocks (1974, Iranian revolution, Gulf War) as well 
as all other changes in relative prices during the period. This will be important below in our 
interpretation of the impact of PCPI/PGDP as relating to trade costs.  
In Table 3 we present the regressions with the nominal exchange rate as a separate 
conditioning variable. As we noted earlier, this serves the essential role of clarifying whether 
the coefficient on our relative price term partly reflects the influence of the nominal exchange 
rate on trade as well as trade costs.  In accordance with the theoretical analysis, the nominal 
exchange rate we use is the effective rate, constructed on the basis of the import trade 
weights. The results are interesting:  the coefficient on the nominal exchange rate is statisti-
cally significant in the constrained regression at the 10 percent confidence level. But its mag-
nitude is numerically very close to zero, and its presence does not affect the magnitude or the 
significance of the coefficient on the relative price term.
8 Of some interest too, the variable is 
                                                 
7 For example, the population term shows up with the wrong sign in the first sub-sample and the coefficient on 
the FTA term becomes significant at the 10% level in this sub-sample. For a clear statement of the reason to ex-
pect a negative sign of the population term in the gravity model, see Frankel and Romer (1999). 
8 This need not be surprising since our estimates pertain to long run adjustments in trade balances. Nominal ex-
change rate movements promote real exchange rate changes in the short run. But their contribution to long run 
movements in the real exchange rate is not nearly as plain. 
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completely insignificant in the unconstrained regression. This reinforces our view that the 
constraint is important in bringing to light the effects of price variables that influence the de-
sired trade balance or imports relative to exports. 
Our ‘headline’ figure for the elasticity of the influence of  i
CPI P / i
GDP P  on mij is 0.3. By 
implication, this 0.3 estimate also applies (with the opposite sign) to the impact of  i
CPI P/ i
GDP P 
on country i’s exports to its trading partners. If we start from balanced trade, it follows that 
the elasticity of influence of our relative price term on the aggregate balance of trade is 0.6, 
where this figure refers to the change in exports minus imports as a percentage of trade (ex-
ports plus imports divided by two). Consequently, the required percentage change in this rela-
tive price term in order to obtain a one percent movement in the trade balance is 1.67 percent. 
Two fundamental issues remain for discussion. One is why we can reasonably con-
clude that trade costs are the essential factor underlying our estimates of the impact of 
i
CPI P / i
GDP P . The other is the reconciliation of our proposed solution to the FH puzzle with 
OR’s explanation of the “home bias” puzzle.  
 
6. Trade Costs and the Influence of Consumer Prices Relative to Producer Prices 
  The consumer price index is made up of prices of imports and home-produced goods. 
Purely as an expository device, suppose we equate all producer prices and consumer prices on 
home-produced goods. This agrees with our theoretical discussion, where we suppose zero 
trade costs at home, although, as we shall see shortly, this assumption is inessential. Then if 
we let pi be the index of the production price of the home good, pj be the index of the produc-
tion price of the good of country j and K be the number of countries, we may write 
i
CPI P/ i
GDP P a s :  
 
i
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τij in equation (16),  we may recall, is the fraction of tij consisting exclusively of money trade   18
costs or differences between prices CIF and FOB.  
i
CPI P/ i
GDP P  thus depends on  i j p / p a n d i τ . Quite importantly, values of  i j p / pa r e  
negatively related across countries and average around one. If production costs and mark-ups 
are low (below one) in some countries relative to others, they must be high (above one) else-
where, at least on average. Therefore, if we suppose symmetry of positive and negative ef-
fects, the costs and mark-ups have no significant impact on the coefficient of  i
CPI P/ i
GDP P on 
the whole. In fact, this reasoning applies to domestic trade costs too, so that our earlier as-
sumption of no domestic trade costs is unnecessary, as stated above (but it aids the exposi-
tion). On the other hand, foreign trade costs necessarily raise consumer prices relative to pro-
duction prices everywhere. Indeed, we believe this factor to be implicit in OR’s emphasis on 
trade costs as the key to the six major puzzles in international macroeconomics.   
However, we make allowance for some major deviations from this general reasoning 
in our empirical tests. Quite specifically, we admit asymmetric effects of changes in  i j p / p on 
importing and exporting countries by controlling for the net impact of all movements in pro-
duction costs, mark-ups and domestic trade costs (including taxes) at the world level on de-
sired imports through the use of time dummies. Thus, as explained before, the net difference 
between the impact of the oil shocks on the demand for imports of oil importers and oil ex-
porters enters fully in our results. In addition, we control for movements in the nominal effec-
tive exchange rate. By construction, this price must work in the same direction for all coun-
tries on the demand for imports (that is, in the case of pass-through). Given that we control for 
all changes at the world level over time and the nominal effective exchange rate, we conclude 
that the coefficient of  i
CPI P/ i




                                                 
9 In the case of the price of oil, we experimented with the separate effects on demand for imports of oil importers 
and exporters (using as our measure of the oil price the average 3-month spot price of crude in US dollars, as re-
corded in the IMF International Financial Statistics CD-Rom (IFS, 2002), divided by the US consumer price 
index.) The results confirm the usual impression that the adverse impact of the oil shocks on the imports of the 
oil-importing nations exceeded the impact on the oil-exporting ones. Since some collinearity arises between the 
relative oil price for importers and  i
CPI P / i
GDP P , and since we wish to isolate the impact of  i
CPI P / i
GDP P , it seems 
right to focus on the results in the absence of any disaggregation of the price of oil.   19
7. Trade Costs and the Home Bias Puzzle 
A higher coefficient of  i
CPI P/ i
GDP P than .3 would have meant the need for a lower change 
in  i
CPI P/ i
GDP P in order to obtain a one percent change in the trade balance. Evidently, there-
fore, our explanation of the FH puzzle depends on a low, yet significant, impact of trade costs 
on imports. On the contrary, OR require a large impact of trade costs on imports to explain 
the “home bias” puzzle in their way. There is therefore a basic tension between our proposed 
solution to the FH puzzle and OR’s explanation of the “home bias” puzzle.
10 In dealing with 
this issue, we shall proceed in two steps. First, we will explain why our estimate for the im-
pact of  i
CPI P/ i
GDP P  on the trade balance of 0.3 is really too low to explain the “home bias” 
puzzle based on trade costs alone, along the lines of OR. Second, we shall go on to suggest a 
solution and also try to justify it. As we shall see, our solution relies on a basic distinction be-
tween trade costs relating to the trade balance and trade costs arising due to increasing levels 
of openness. The Feldstein-Horioka puzzle evidently relates to intertemporal substitution and 
therefore the trade balance, while the home bias puzzle relates to openness or the ratio of to-
tal trade to output.   
 OR’s results can be shown to follow exactly in our set up under their assumptions.  Con-
sider two nations of equal size, and therefore Yi = Yj, and assume balanced trade, or Yi = Ai. 
Additionally, assume endowment economies with all relative prices the same and equal to 
one. Under these assumptions, (since tii = 0) our equation (8) says that the ratio of home trade 
to foreign trade of either country with the other, mii/mij, is:  
 
1
ij) t 1 (
− θ + . 
According to OR’s suggested baseline figures, θ equals 6 and the export price is 25% below 
the import price. Given their further assumption that all trade costs are money costs, or tij = 
τij, this implies a value of 1+tij of 1/0.75, or 1.33. Consequently, mii/mij is about 4.2, which 
implies a degree of openness of 0.19 (a ratio of 81/19 of home to foreign goods). These are 
                                                 
10 OR effectively sidestep this difficulty by switching to an analysis of the impact of the real interest rate on the 
current account when they turn from the “home bias” to the FH puzzle. Even a moderate percentage change in 
relative prices may imply a large percentage movement in present relative to future real interest rates. Therefore, 
the same moderate change in relative price that they think would suffice to explain home bias would contribute 
heavily, in their reasoning, to the FH puzzle as well.     20
precisely the numbers that OR propose as reasonable for the world as a whole. In this 
schema, if tij were zero, mii/mij would be one. Thus, all of “home bias” stems from trade 
costs.  
However, the value of tij that we recover from our regressions using OR’s assumptions 
is considerably below the one they suggest.  To see this, note to begin with that  i
CPI P/ i
GDP P 
in our work does not correspond exactly to the import price relative to the export price in 
OR’s example.  Instead, it refers to αi + (1–αi)(1 + tij), as seen from equation (19) (after 
equating τij and tij and setting  j p and pi equal to one).  Thus, in terms of OR’s schematic ex-
ample, our estimate relates to the value of (1–αi)
θ − +
1
ij) t 1 ( . For mii, 
θ − +
1
ij) t 1 ( reduces to 1, 
and therefore our estimate of the impact of  i
CPI P / i
GDP P  on mii/mij  corresponds to 
) 1 ( i α − 1
ij) t 1 ( − θ +  rather than 1
ij) t 1 ( − θ + . We estimate this value as .3. Therefore, if we as-
sign a value of .81 to i α , we have an estimate of  1
ij) t 1 ( − θ +  of around 1.58. This implies a 
value of tij of around .1 – far below the .33 value that OR regard as reasonable (given their 
treatment of 1+ tij = 1/.75 as a baseline).
11  
  In fact, the problem is more complicated for two reasons. OR’s ratio of 4.2 for mii/mij 
only looks reasonable because of their two-country example. In a multi-country framework 
this ratio would change dramatically. For example, assume the same parameter values as 
theirs but 100 identical countries so that country i imports from 99 others. In that case, the 
baseline situation without trade costs is one of .99 openness. Trade costs raising the ratio 
mii/mij by a factor of 4.2 in relation to each of the 99 foreign countries would then yield a rise 
in the percentage of home consumption from .01 to approximately .041.
12 In order to reduce 
the value of openness to a level as low as .19, OR require a value of mii/mij of approximately 
422 or about 100 times 4.2.
13 In that case, 1 + tij becomes around 3.35.  This then widens the 
gap between our estimate of tij of only .1 and the value necessary for the benchmark of .19 
                                                 
11 In light of our estimate of the influence of (1–αi) (1 + tij) on mij, one could argue that the corresponding impact 
on mii is αi (1 + tij). In this case, our estimate of .3 would correspond to a value of [(1–αi)/αi] (1 + tij)
θ–1 for the 
impact on mii/mij. This would heighten the problem. In that case, we would have an implicit value of tij of only 
around .05 in case αi = .81.  
12 The ratio of home consumption will be 4.2X where 99X + 4.2X = 1.  
13 Let spending on the 99 foreign goods make up altogether .19 of the total consumer basket. Then the spending 
on the home good in relation to the individual foreign one is .81 divided by .19/99.   21
openness (the needed tij becomes 235%).
14 It also raises doubts about OR’s claim that moder-
ate trade costs suffice to generate the observed degree of home bias in the world under their 
assumptions.  
The second problem relates to the identification of tij and τij. So far as tij exceeds τij, 
our implicit figure for money trade costs will be even lower than .1. But we regard this next 
problem as minor relative to the distortion introduced by limiting the analysis to a two-
country framework.  As indicated before, non-money trade costs matter mostly on a cross-
sectional basis, or in choosing to trade between alternative foreign partners. In the strict tem-
poral dimension, money costs probably dominate trade costs. Our estimate of the impact of 
i
CPI P / i
GDP P  relates strictly to the temporal dimension. Thus, we do not believe that equating tij 
and τij is a big problem in our present context or OR’s. This same line of reasoning probably 
underlies OR’s willingness to identify trade costs with the monetary costs.  
 As a preliminary remark, note that our estimate of τij of .1 is highly sensitive to the 
coefficient of .3. Even if we stick with all of OR’s assumptions,  i α = .81 and θ=6, a doubling 
of the estimate of the impact of  i
CPI P/ i
GDP P  or a rise to .6 leads to a rise of τij from around .1 
to .26 (x ≅ 1.26 for x
5 = .6 ÷ .19), which is clearly much closer to OR’s ballpark figure of 
0.33. (Lower values of  i 1 α − and θ further reduce the problem of raising τij.) How might this 
higher figure obtain? 
In answer, the assumption of flat values of τij is dubious, as OR recognize themselves. 
As ratios of trade to output rise, trade in highly heterogeneous goods and in heavy, difficult-
to-transport goods, must increase. Consequently, even if values of τij of around .33 exist in 
trade, the values of τij relating to many goods that are not traded may well be over 100 per-
cent.
15 (Betts and Kehoe (2001) and Bergen and Glick (2004) recently reason on this basis.) 
As a result, there are really two separate values of trade costs that enter in case of movements 
                                                 
14 Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) recently estimate tij as 170%. This might suggest that 235% is not as out-
landish as it may seem at first blush. But the impression is probably misleading, since their figure covers far 
more than ours: it includes the tax equivalent of all non-money impediments to foreign trade and all of the home 
impediments to domestic trade as well. 
15 In addition, elasticities of substitution may vary between goods, going from extremely high figures for home 
goods with very close substitutes abroad to very low figures. Consequently, as long as tij is non-trivially greater 
than zero, θ alone may account for a significant rise of α above .01 in our example with 100 countries (because 
of the low values of  θ). This further reduces the difficulty of obtaining high values of α in equation (16).     22
of bilateral trade. One of them is relevant when the movements concern mere redistributions 
of output between existing firms or the churning of firms and varieties without any change in 
aggregate trade at a given level of output.  The other is relevant when the ratio of trade to out-
put changes. The first level, occurring when the trade ratio or degree of openness stays the 
same, is lower than the second, occurring when the trade ratio moves. The first is also the 
relevant one in the case of the FH puzzle, while the second is the relevant one in the case of 
the “home bias” puzzle. Our estimates relate to the first. OR clearly have in mind the second.  
There are several reasons why the two values of trade costs may be expected to differ 
even at the margin. If additional trade means that new goods (not simply new varieties) enter 
into foreign trade, the rise in trade costs at the margin may jump up rather than go up continu-
ously. In addition, the trade costs may be higher at first than they will become later, after the 
initial information and distribution problems of launching the new products abroad settle 
down. In this connection, a lot of recent empirical work notably shows that entry of individual 
firms into export activity always entails major once-and-for-all costs of production and distri-
bution. (See Roberts and Tybout (1997), Bernard and Jensen (2001) and Bernard and Wagner 
(2001).) Those fixed costs may well be more severe if entry means introducing new products 
abroad (rather than previously exported ones or newly exported ones that are merely differen-
tiated, as is more likely when the adjustments concern the trade balance at a set level of na-
tional trade).   
Our analysis focuses on the trade balance, and therefore our estimate of trade costs re-
lates to the lower margin. The higher margin relates to openness and therefore to the ratio of 
total trade to output, which we do not analyze. This is not necessarily conclusive, however, 
since movements in the ratios of trade balances to output in our sample period could be posi-
tively correlated with movements in the ratios of trade to output. Thus, we calculated the cor-
relation between the two ratios in our panel. The result is as follows:   
) 405 . 0 (    0.0168
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(where the number in parentheses is the p value). The correlation is negligible, negative and 
statistically insignificant. We therefore conclude that our estimate relates to the lower margin   23
for trade costs.   
Ruhl (2003) makes a similar point in a closely related context.  He seeks to reconcile 
the low estimates of the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods in the 
business cycle literature with the much higher estimates of this same elasticity in the literature 
on the growth of trade, where the concern is with the impact of trade liberalization, free trade 
agreements and the like. In the former literature, the elasticities regard responses to transitory 
shocks whereas in the latter, they relate to responses to permanent shocks. He considers the 
former adjustments as ones on the “intensive margin” and the latter as ones on the “extensive 
margin”. Our context differs because the adjustments in trade balance that we are interested in 
may well be persistent. However, the similarity remains so far as those adjustments do not 
necessarily require any change in the size of the traded goods sector relative to the economy 
as a whole,  and therefore in the total range of goods entering into trade (ordered by trade 
costs). Thus, his distinction between adjustments at the intensive margin (same range of 
goods) and the extensive margin (wider range of goods) is apt.   
 
 
8. Concluding discussion 
In this paper, we have provided empirical support for OR’s hypothesis that trade costs 
contribute to resolving the FH puzzle. According to our estimates, countries require a 1.67 
percent adjustment in the price of the goods they consume relative to the price of the goods 
they produce for every percentage movement in their trade balance. Based on our interpreta-
tion of the relative price term, trade costs are the essential factor in the explanation. In support 
of this view, we have admitted time fixed effects and the nominal effective exchange rate as 
separate conditioning variables. Therefore, we can exclude relative price movements at the 
world level and the effective exchange rate as influences in our estimates.  
Two points deserve renewed emphasis at the end. First, our effort to resolve the FH 
puzzle in terms of trade costs deviates from OR in one crucial respect: we do not rely on ex-
pected future reversals in trade balance positions for our solution. Rather, in our view, the ar-
gument for their position can be made without going beyond the implications of their stand   24
relating to trade balances. The reason for this deviation from them seems to us strong: coun-
tries with trade balance deficits tend to be net creditors, while those with trade surpluses tend 
to be net debtors. Studies of the FH puzzle cover wide samples of countries. Therefore, in 
dealing with the puzzle, it seems precarious to us to treat trade imbalances as unsustainable. 
There is little reason for markets systematically to expect trade balances to reverse and to em-
bed such reversals in their real interest rate expectations (all the less so since the countries 
with trade deficits may have adequate future income prospects). This deviation from OR 
brings us close to Lane and Milesi Ferretti (2002a) and their emphasis on the stability of trade 
balance positions, but takes us away from the position of KV, who attempt to explain the FH 
puzzle on the basis of desired asset portfolio behavior in the long run.  Contrary to KV’s posi-
tion, the time series evidence shows trade balances to be just as sluggish as current accounts. 
If KV were correct, and markets deliberately adapted their trade balances to achieve desired 
portfolio balances, we would expect trade balances to be less sluggish than current account 
balances. The time series evidence, though, is consistent with our view that the sluggishness 
of trade balances is the key to the sluggishness of current accounts. 
  The second point requiring emphasis in closing regards certain econometric features of 
our work. We have used a gravity framework and data on bilateral trade to draw out implica-
tions about the impact of relative prices on national trade balances.  Previous researchers have 
also introduced relative prices into the gravity framework, but their emphasis was on separate 
import and export responses to such prices (see, for example, Bergstrand (1989) and Bayoumi 
(1998)). As far as we are aware, ours is the first attempt to use the gravity model to address 
the relationship between relative prices and national trade balances.  In order to do so, despite 
the essential bilateral trade orientation of the model, we adopted a simple yet popular version 
of the gravity approach with passive export behavior, in which we incorporated desired in-
tertemporal substitution at the national level. The relevant macroeconomic concern with the 
future has a profound role on our estimates. When we do not incorporate this effect, the rela-
tive price variable has no influence on bilateral trade, but when we do incorporate it the influ-
ence of this variable emerges clearly.    25
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 Table 1 – Unconstrained Estimates 
 
  1980–2000 1980-1989  1990-2000 
Log(Ai*Yj) .670    .466    .546   
 (.020)    (.028)    (.026) 
 
 
Log(PCPI / PGDP)  -.056          -.154*    .139   
  (.062)   (.093)   (.091) 
 
 
Log(Distance)  -1.345   -1.250   -1.390  
 (.030)    (.036)    (.030) 
 
 
Common Border (0,1)  .418    .266*  .546  
 (.130)    (.145)  (.135) 
 
 
Common Country (0,1)  .255  -.049  .196  
  (.407)   (.705)   (.532) 
 
 
Ex-Common Colonizer (0,1)  .572    .531    .589   
 (.070)    (.084)    (.074) 
 
 







            
Log(Populationi*Populationj) -.023    -.016  -.020  
 (.008)    (.022)  (.006) 
 
 








Currency Union (0,1)  .776    .920    .656   
 (.165)    (.192)    (.171) 
 
 
Common Language  .894    .803    .945  
  (.067)   (.076)   (.071) 
 
 
Number of Observations  186362   70682   115680  
          
Wald-







          
Rho  .364   -  -  
 
NOTES: Regressions include time fixed effects and separate countries fixed effects for countries as 
importers and as exporters (see equation (11) in the text). The coefficients of these dummies are not 
reported; robust standard errors in parentheses; correction for clustering of country pairs; characters in 
bold indicate coefficients significant at the 1% level; ** and * denote significance at the 5% and at the 
10% level, respectively. Rho denotes the correlation between observed net imports and predicted net 
imports: Corr(Σt(Mi-Mji)t, Σt t ji i ) M ˆ M ˆ ( − ) 
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Table 2 – Constrained Estimates 
 
  1980–2000 1980-1989 1990-2000 
Log(Ai*Yj)  .508  .402  .412  
  (.033)  (.044)  (.048) 
 
 
Log(PCPI / PGDP)  -.306   -.285**   -.291*  
 (.102)    (.127)  (.160) 
 
 
Log(Distance)  -1.339  -1.271  -1.393  
  (.030)  (.037)  (.030) 
 
 
Common Border (0,1)  .447    .309**   .573  
 (.132)    (.146)  (.140) 
 
 
Common Country (0,1)  .698  .366  .630  
  (.492)  (.561)  (.772) 
 
 
Ex-Common  Colonizer  (0,1)  .683  .563  .605  
  (.072)  (.086)  (.076) 
 
 








Log(Populationi*Populationj) -.175    .062*   .020   
 (.019)    (.034)  (.014) 
 
 
Free Trade Area (0,1)  .152   .216*   .097  
  (.110)  (.127)  (.111) 
 
 
Currency  Union  (0,1)  .602  .710  .577  
  (.183)  (.221)  (.184) 
 
 
Common  Language  .893  .775  .920  
  (.070)  (.081)  (.074) 
 
 
Number of Observations  186362   70682   115680  
        
Wald-







        
Rho  .813   -  -  
 
NOTES: Regressions include time fixed effects and separate countries fixed effects for countries as 
importers and as exporters (see equation (11) in the text). The coefficients of these dummies are not re-
ported; robust standard errors in parentheses; correction for clustering of country pairs; characters in 
bold indicate coefficients significant at the 1% level; ** and * denote significance at the 5% and at the 
10% level, respectively. Rho denotes the correlation between observed net imports and predicted net 
imports: Corr(Σt(Mi-Mji)t, Σt t ji i ) M ˆ M ˆ ( − )   30
Table 3 – Regressions with the Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (1980-2000) 
 
  Unconstrained   Constrained 






log(PCPI /PGDP)  -.062 
(.062) 


































































Number of Observations  184806   184806   
Wald-







Log-Likelihood  -377463   -415926   
 
NOTES: Regressions include time fixed effects and separate countries fixed effects for countries as 
importers and as exporters (see equation (11) in the text). The coefficients of these dummies are not 
reported; robust standard errors in parentheses; correction for clustering of country pairs; characters in 
bold indicate coefficients significant at the 1% level; ** and * denote significance at the 5% and at the 
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Table 4 – Summary Statistics 
 
Variable  Mean Standard  Deviation Minimum  Maximum
 









        
Log of Ai*Yj  39.1436 2.8909 26.9055  49.7239 
        
Log of PCPI/PGDP  -.02056 .1328  -.5782  1.3721 
        
Log of Real Oil Price  .3070 .4297  -.3419  1.3717 
        
Log of Distance  8.6360 .8459  1.3871  9.8934 
        
Log Product of Population  32.2735 2.5630 21.5657  41.6974 
        
Common Border  .0292 .1686  0  1 
        
Common Country  .0001 .0113  0  1 
        
Ex-Common Colonizer  .0919 .2889  0  1 
        
Ex-Colonial Relationship  .01505 .1217  0  1 
        
Free Trade Area  .0398 .1956  0  1 
        
Currency Union  .0127 .1121  0  1 
        
Common Language  .1420 .2933  0  1 
 Table 5 – Correlation Matrix 
 
 A i*Yj P PO  D Border ComCty  ComCol ColRel Pi*Pj FTA CU CL 
Ai*Yj - Log of (Absorptioni*GDPj) 
 
1 
                   
P   - Log of (PCPI/PGDP)   -.013 
 
1 
                  





               









             
Border  -.030 -.024 .004 -.397 1               
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.037Figure 1 - Variance Ratios for Trade Balance (TB), Current Accounts (CA), and Net 

















































































TB  NFA  CA 
 
NOTES: Variance Ratios are: Vk=(1/k)·[(Var(qt-qt-k)) ·(Var(qt-qt-1))
-1], k=1, 2, 4, 6, 8. Trade Balances, 
Current Accounts, and Net Foreign Assets are scaled by Gross Domestic Product. 
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TB  NFA  CA 
 
NOTES: Variance Ratios are: Vk=(1/k)·[(Var(qt-qt-k)) ·(Var(qt-qt-1))
-1], k=1, 2, 4, 6, 8. Trade Balances, 




Mij: Bilateral Imports CIF of i from j (Source: IMF Directions of Trade Statistics, DOTS 
2002), expressed in US$ and transformed in constant dollars by dividing by the US CPI 
 
Distanceij: Great circle distances are calculated using the arc-geometry formula on the lati-
tude and longitude coordinates of the most populous city. 
 
Ai: Absorption of country i. The figure is obtained by subtracting the trade balance (in US$, 
divided by the US CPI) from the GDP (in US$ divided by the US CPI). Both series are taken 
from the World Bank World Development Indicators (hereafter WDI (2003)) 
  
Yj: Gross Domestic Product of country j in current US$ divided by the US CPI series. Both 
series are taken from the WDI (2003) 
 
PCPI: Consumer Price Index (1995=100) taken from the WDI (2003) 
 
PGDP: GDP Deflator (1995=100) taken from the WDI (2003) 
 
Real Price of Oil: Average crude oil price 3-months Spot Price Index from the IMF-IFS CD-
Rom (2002), line 00176AADZF). The series is in US$ and has been divided by the US CPI. 
 
Population: Population taken from the WDI (2002) 
 
Common Language: See Melitz (2004) 
 
List of Countries  
I.S. Of Afghanistan*, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua And Barbuda*, Argentina, Aruba*, 
Australia, Austria, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, 
Bhutan*, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam*, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, 
Cameroon, Canada, Central African Rep., Chad, Chile, People's Rep Of China, Colombia, 
Comoros*, Dem. Rep. Of Congo, Republic Of Congo, Costa Rica, Cote D’Ivoire, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti*, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El 
Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, The Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, 
Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea*, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hun-
gary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, I.R. Of Iran, Iraq*, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jor-
dan, Kenya, Kiribati*, Kuwait, People's Dem. Rep. Of Lao, Lebanon*, Liberia*, Libya*, Ma-
cedonia, Republic Of, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, Netherlands An-
tilles*, New Caledonia*, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, 
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar*, Romania, 
Russian Federation, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome & Principe*, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sey-
chelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia*, South Africa, South Korea, 
Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts And Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & Grens., Sudan, Suriname, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad And 
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates*, United Kingdom, United States, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, West Bank*, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
*the country is only an exporter in the dataset   36
 
Free Trade Areas 
Regional Trade Agreements notified to the GATT/WTO and in force.  
(Source: http://www.wto.org as of 30
th of June 2002) 
 
1) EC/EEA/EFTA/EU  
Belgium, Bel-Lux, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
UK, Norway, Switzerland, Malta, OCTs (Greenland, New Caledonia, French Polynesia, St. 
Pierre and Miquelon,  Aruba, New Antilles, Falklands, St. Helena); 
Austria (since 1995), Finland (since 1995), Sweden (since 1995), Greece (since 1981), Portu-
gal (since 1986), Spain (since 1986). 
2) NAFTA Free Trade Agreement, since 1994 
Canada, Mexico, USA 
3) CARICOM Customs Union, since 1973 
Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, 
Trinidad and Tobago,  St. Vincent and Grenadines, St. Kitts and Nevis, Suriname 
4) SPARTECA Free Trade Agreement, since 1977 
Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, Vanuatu. 
5) MERCOSUR Customs Union, since 1991 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay 
6) BAFTA Free Trade Agreement, since 1994 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
7) CACM Customs Union, since 1961 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua. 
8) US-ISRAEL Free Trade Agreement, since 1985 
United States, Israel 
9) CER Free Trade Agreement, since 1983  
Australia and New Zealand 
 
Common Countries  
(Source: CIA World Factbook 2002) 
 
China, Hong Kong (since 1997) and Macao; Denmark, Faeroe Islands and Greenland; 
France, French Polynesia, Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Martinique, New Caledonia, Reun-
ion, and St. Pierre & Miquelon; The Netherlands, ––Aruba and Netherlands Antilles; United 
Kingdom, Bermuda, Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, and St. Helena; United States, American Sa-
moa and Guam. 
 
Ex-Colonial Relationship and Ex-Common Colonizer 
(Source: CIA World Factbook 2002) 
 
Australia and Papua New Guinea; Belgium and Burundi, Dem. Rep. Of Congo; France and 
Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Rep., Chad, Congo Rep. 
Of, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea, Lao People’s Rep, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Ni-
ger, Senegal, Syrian Arab Rep., Togo, Tunisia, Vietnam; Italy and Libya; New Zealand and 
Samoa;  Portugal and Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Sao Tome & Prin-
cipe, Timor; Spain and Equatorial Guinea; South Africa and Namibia; The Netherlands and 
Indonesia, Suriname; Japan and North Korea, South Korea; USA and Palau, Philippines; 
United Kingdom and The Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Bot-  37
swana, Brunei Darussalam, Cyprus, Dominica, Fiji, The Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, 
Hong Kong, India, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, 
Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Myanmar, Nauru, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vin-
cent & Grenadines, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, 
Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Vanuatu, Zambia, Zimbabwe. (Countries in bold characters 
are the ex-colonizers). 
 
Currency Unions 
(Source: Glick and Rose (2002), updated with information from the IMF International Finan-
cial Statistics Book (2002)) 
 
1)  Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. 
Vincent & Grenadines;  
2)  Aruba, Netherlands Antilles, Suriname (until 1994); Australia, Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga 
(until 1991), Tuvalu;  
3)  Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Nether-
lands, Portugal and Spain (Since 1999);  
4)  Cameroon, Togo;  
5)  Central African Rep., Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Comoros (until 1994), Rep. of Congo, 
Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar (until 1982), Mali, 
Niger, Senegal, Togo;  
6)  Denmark, Faeroe Islands, Greenland;  
7)  France, French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Reunion, St. Pierre & Miquelon;  
8)  Lesotho, South Africa, Swaziland;  
9)  New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Wallis & Futuna;  
10) Qatar, United Arab Emirates;  
11) United Kingdom, Falkland  Islands, Gibraltar, St. Helena;  
12) United States, American Samoa, Bahamas, Bermuda, Dominican Rep. (until 1985), 






 CESifo Working Paper Series 




1465 François Ortalo-Magné and Sven Rady, Heterogeneity within Communities: A 
Stochastic Model with Tenure Choice, May 2005 
 
1466 Jukka Pirttilä and Sanna Tenhunen, Pawns and Queens Revisited: Public Provision of 
Private Goods when Individuals make Mistakes, May 2005 
 
1467 Ernst Fehr, Susanne Kremhelmer and Klaus M. Schmidt, Fairness and the Optimal 
Allocation of Ownership Rights, May 2005 
 
1468 Bruno S. Frey, Knight Fever – Towards an Economics of Awards, May 2005 
 
1469 Torberg Falch and Marte Rønning, The Influence of Student Achievement on Teacher 
Turnover, May 2005 
 
1470 John Komlos and Peter Salamon, The Poverty of Growth with Interdependent Utility 
Functions, May 2005 
 
1471 Hui Huang, Yi Wang, Yiming Wang, John Whalley and Shunming Zhang, A Trade 
Model with an Optimal Exchange Rate Motivated by Current Discussion of a Chinese 
Renminbi Float, May 2005 
 
1472 Helge Holden, Lars Holden and Steinar Holden, Contract Adjustment under 
Uncertainty, May 2005 
 
1473 Kai A. Konrad, Silent Interests and All-Pay Auctions, May 2005 
 
1474 Ingo Vogelsang, Electricity Transmission Pricing and Performance-Based Regulation, 
May 2005 
 
1475 Spiros Bougheas and Raymond Riezman, Trade and the Distribution of Human Capital, 
June 2005 
 
1476 Vesa Kanniainen, Seppo Kari and Jouko Ylä-Liedenpohja, The Start-Up and Growth 
Stages in Enterprise Formation: The “New View” of Dividend Taxation Reconsidered, 
June 2005 
 
1477 M. Hashem Pesaran, L. Vanessa Smith and Ron P. Smith, What if the UK had Joined 
the Euro in 1999? An Empirical Evaluation Using a Global VAR, June 2005 
 
1478 Chang Woon Nam and Doina Maria Radulescu, Effects of Corporate Tax Reforms on 
SMEs’ Investment Decisions under the Particular Consideration of Inflation, June 2005 
 
1479 Panos Hatzipanayotou, Sajal Lahiri and Michael S. Michael, Globalization, Cross-
Border Pollution and Welfare, June 2005 
  
1480 John Whalley, Pitfalls in the Use of Ad valorem Equivalent Representations of the 
Trade Impacts of Domestic Policies, June 2005 
 
1481 Edward B. Barbier and Michael Rauscher, Trade and Development in a Labor Surplus 
Economy, June 2005 
 
1482 Harrie A. A. Verbon and Cees A. Withagen, Tradable Emission Permits in a Federal 
System, June 2005 
 
1483 Hendrik Hakenes and Andreas Irmen, On the Long-Run Evolution of Technological 
Knowledge, June 2005 
 
1484 Nicolas Schmitt and Antoine Soubeyran, A Simple Model of Brain Circulation, June 
2005 
 
1485 Carsten Hefeker, Uncertainty, Wage Setting and Decision Making in a Monetary Union, 
June 2005 
 
1486 Ondřej Schneider and Jan Zápal, Fiscal Policy in New EU Member States – Go East, 
Prudent Man!, June 2005 
 
1487 Christian Schultz, Virtual Capacity and Competition, June 2005 
 
1488 Yvan Lengwiler and Elmar Wolfstetter, Bid Rigging – An Analysis of Corruption in 
Auctions, June 2005 
 
1489 Johannes Becker and Clemens Fuest, Does Germany Collect Revenue from Taxing 
Capital Income?, June 2005 
 
1490 Axel Dreher and Panu Poutvaara, Student Flows and Migration: An Empirical Analysis, 
June 2005 
 
1491 Bernd Huber and Marco Runkel, Interregional Redistribution and Budget Institutions 
under Asymmetric Information, June 2005 
 
1492 Guido Tabellini, Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of 
Europe, July 2005 
 
1493 Kurt R. Brekke and Michael Kuhn, Direct to Consumer Advertising in Pharmaceutical 
Markets, July 2005 
 
1494 Martín Gonzalez-Eiras and Dirk Niepelt, Sustaining Social Security, July 2005 
 
1495 Alfons J. Weichenrieder, (Why) Do we need Corporate Taxation?, July 2005 
 
1496 Paolo M. Panteghini, S-Based Taxation under Default Risk, July 2005 
 
1497 Panos Hatzipanayotou and Michael S. Michael, Migration, Tied Foreign Aid and the 
Welfare State, July 2005 
  
1498 Agata Antkiewicz and John Whalley, BRICSAM and the Non-WTO, July 2005 
 
1499 Petr Hedbávný, Ondřej Schneider and Jan Zápal, A Fiscal Rule that has Teeth: A 
Suggestion for a ‘Fiscal Sustainability Council’ underpinned by the Financial Markets, 
July 2005 
 
1500 J. Atsu Amegashie and Marco Runkel, Sabotaging Potential Rivals, July 2005 
 
1501 Heikki Oksanen, Actuarial Neutrality across Generations Applied to Public Pensions 
under Population Ageing: Effects on Government Finances and National Saving, July 
2005 
 
1502 Xenia Matschke, Costly Revenue-Raising and the Case for Favoring Import-Competing 
Industries, July 2005 
 
1503 Horst Raff and Nicolas Schmitt, Why Parallel Trade may Raise Producers Profits, July 
2005 
 
1504 Alberto Bisin and Piero Gottardi, Efficient Competitive Equilibria with Adverse 
Selection, July 2005 
 
1505 Peter A. Zadrozny, Necessary and Sufficient Restrictions for Existence of a Unique 
Fourth Moment of a Univariate GARCH(p,q) Process, July 2005 
 
1506 Rainer Niemann and Corinna Treisch, Group Taxation, Asymmetric Taxation and 
Cross-Border Investment Incentives in Austria, July 2005 
 
1507 Thomas Christiaans, Thomas Eichner and Ruediger Pethig, Optimal Pest Control in 
Agriculture, July 2005 
 
1508 Biswa N. Bhattacharyay and Prabir De, Promotion of Trade and Investments between 
China and India: The Case of Southwest China and East and Northeast India, July 2005 
 
1509 Jean Hindriks and Ben Lockwood, Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: 
Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare, July 2005 
 
1510 Michelle R. Garfinkel, Stergios Skaperdas and Constantinos Syropoulos, Globalization 
and Domestic Conflict, July 2005 
 
1511 Jesús Crespo-Cuaresma, Balázs Égert and Ronald MacDonald, Non-Linear Exchange 
Rate Dynamics in Target Zones: A Bumpy Road towards a Honeymoon – Some 
Evidence from the ERM, ERM2 and Selected New EU Member States, July 2005 
 
1512 David S. Evans and Michael Salinger, Curing Sinus Headaches and Tying Law: An 
Empirical Analysis of Bundling Decongestants and Pain Relievers, August 2005 
 




1514 Fahad Khalil, David Martimort and Bruno Parigi, Monitoring a Common Agent: 
Implications for Financial Contracting, August 2005 
 
1515 Volker Grossmann and Panu Poutvaara, Pareto-Improving Bequest Taxation, August 
2005 
 
1516 Lars P. Feld and Emmanuelle Reulier, Strategic Tax Competition in Switzerland: 
Evidence from a Panel of the Swiss Cantons, August 2005 
 
1517 Kira Boerner and Silke Uebelmesser, Migration and the Welfare State: The Economic 
Power of the Non-Voter?, August 2005 
 
1518 Gabriela Schütz, Heinrich W. Ursprung and Ludger Wößmann, Education Policy and 
Equality of Opportunity, August 2005 
 
1519 David S. Evans and Michael A. Salinger, Curing Sinus Headaches and Tying Law: An 
Empirical Analysis of Bundling Decongestants and Pain Relievers, August 2005 
 
1520 Michel Beine, Paul De Grauwe and Marianna Grimaldi, The Impact of FX Central Bank 
Intervention in a Noise Trading Framework, August 2005 
 
1521 Volker Meier and Matthias Wrede, Pension, Fertility, and Education, August 2005 
 
1522 Saku Aura and Thomas Davidoff, Optimal Commodity Taxation when Land and 
Structures must be Taxed at the Same Rate, August 2005 
 
1523 Andreas Haufler and Søren Bo Nielsen, Merger Policy to Promote ‘Global Players’? A 
Simple Model, August 2005 
 
1524 Frederick van der Ploeg, The Making of Cultural Policy: A European Perspective, 
August 2005 
 
1525 Alexander Kemnitz, Can Immigrant Employment Alleviate the Demographic Burden? 
The Role of Union Centralization, August 2005 
 
1526 Baoline Chen and Peter A. Zadrozny, Estimated U.S. Manufacturing Production Capital 
and Technology Based on an Estimated Dynamic Economic Model, August 2005 
 
1527 Marcel Gérard, Multijurisdictional Firms and Governments’ Strategies under 
Alternative Tax Designs, August 2005 
 
1528 Joerg Breitscheidel and Hans Gersbach, Self-Financing Environmental Mechanisms, 
August 2005 
 
1529 Giorgio Fazio, Ronald MacDonald and Jacques Mélitz, Trade Costs, Trade Balances 
and Current Accounts: An Application of Gravity to Multilateral Trade, August 2005 